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The functionalist's body 
Interview with Robert D Rupert59 
by Przemyslaw Nowakowski & Witold Wachowski  
The interview was realized in August–October 2014  
 
In the history of philosophy and science, we may find many works that 
have been forgotten, even though it would seem that they anticipated 
some of the ongoing research in a particular way. Do you have your fa-
vorite older works that you think deserve to be appreciated (especially in 
the context of embodied or embedded cognition)? 
I think Ron McClamrock’s Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the 
World deserves more attention than it has gotten in the 4E literature. It was 
published in 1995 and, in my opinion, should be counted among the classics 
from the dawn of the current 4E movement. 
 
As we know, you support the embodied mind theory, but you remain 
skeptical about the extended mind theory. What properties of the body of 
do you consider particularly important for shaping our cognition? 
The bodily properties that influence cognition the most are, I think, structural 
properties of motor commands and of our sensory-based interactions with the 
world. Of particular importance are structural properties having their roots 
in the temporal, spatial, and more generally geometrical profiles of mo-
tor commands and routines and sensory-based bodily interaction with the 
environment. 
I support a weak form of the embodied theory, according to which neural rep-
resentations of, or neural simulations of, bodily activity play a central role in 
cognitive processing. I don’t claim that all human cognitive processing is car-
ried out entirely in a sensori-motor code, but I suspect that a surprising large 
amount is. To the extent that our cognitive processing does involve represen-
tations in an amodal format (a non-motoric code that is not specific to any 
                                                             
59 Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado at Boulder. 
 Professorial Fellow, School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences, The University 
of Edinburgh. 
 Robert.Rupert[]Colorado.edu  
 




sensory modality), I think that sensori-motor interactions cause those amodal 
representational units to appear in the cognitive system; they cause what 
might have otherwise been little more than snippets of neural noise to take on 
functional roles in cognition, and this process also affects the processing pro-
files of the amodal concepts so acquired. This suggests one clear way in which 
the nonneural body shapes the mind, at least if we take “shape” to be is used 
in a standard causal sense. 
In addition, bodily experience or activity causes the formation and refinement 
of bodily representations—involved in motor control, bodily contact with the 
world, correlated sensory experience—and these representations (or their 
neural realizers) affect cognitive processing both via their causal connection 
to the formation of amodal representations (or to the realizers of amodal rep-
resentations) and by the way in which they contribute to the control of behav-
ior alongside co-contributing amodal representations that are directed toward 
the same objects as are the co-active, co-contributing bodily representations. 
I’m not convinced, though, that the nonneural body does any actual cognitive 
processing or is properly part of the cognitive system. For example, when ar-
guing for a strong embodiment thesis, Andy Clark appeals to Susan Goldin-
Meadow’s work on the cognitive role of gestures, which seems to show that 
gesturing during problem-solving changes the nature of the cognitive process; 
on this basis, Clark argues that the gestures literally constitute part of the rel-
evant cognitive processing. I’m just as inclined, however, to think that what 
enhances cognition in these cases is the efferent copy of the motor command 
to gesture, not the gesture itself. These are open empirical questions, though, 
and it might be that the hands (one of the most likely candidates) contribute 
extensively to actual cognitive processing. 
 
Jerry Fodor said: "Who could doubt that the mind is embodied? And given 
that we are all clear that the mind is embodied, where does that get us? 
I  mean, everybody knows the mind is embodied, unless you’ve got reli-
gious stuff or something, some metaphysical or ideological biases, but 
now, right, I agree, the mind’s embodied, and now what do I do? 
Search me!" 
Do you think that the fact of embodied cognition modifies our view of 
cognitive processes (as in Shapiro’s replacement hypothesis), or when we 
describe cognition as embodied, we merely complement the classic cogni-
tive research? 
Yes, the embodied perspective substantially modifies our view of cognitive 
processes and, at the same time, it may still be that the embodied view merely 
complements classic cognitive research. Let me explain.  




I think the embodied perspective modifies our view of cognitive processing in 
at least the three following ways: 
First, with regard to historical interaction and theories of representation. Here 
the embodied perspective helps us to see how the nonsemantically individu-
ated units of cognitive processing arise and how that history affects not just 
the processing profile of those units—which I emphasized in response to the 
preceding question—but the representational value of those units. For exam-
ple, by understanding the conditions under which some bit of neural flux be-
comes a functional cognitive unit, we see simultaneously the sensorimotor 
interactions that establish the representational content of that unit, that is, we 
locate the property, kind, or individual in the environment (typically) that the 
unit represents. The nonsemantically individuated unit represents the thing 
(broadly speaking) interaction with which led to the firming up of that unit as 
a cognitively relevant unit. 
Second, with regard to the processing profile of cognitive units. For any repre-
senting unit that comes to play a role in cognitive processing, there are condi-
tions under which that happens, and those conditions affect what that unit 
ends up doing. Moreover, these conditions normally have a bodily component, 
the nature of which can then contribute to the processing profile of the unit 
the use of which is thereby reinforced. These might be conditions that rein-
force certain movements over others or cause certain kinds of experiences or 
thoughts to be more closely associated than they would have been. 
Third, with regard to architecture. The embodied literature draws our atten-
tion to a wealth of results that implicate bodily processes in cognition. I think 
these results are best interpreted as part of a larger body of evidence, emerg-
ing from all quarters in cognitive science; this body of evidence suggests 
something about the human cognitive architecture, that it contains a massive 
number of representations, many families of which co-represent (they repre-
sent the same object, individual, or property), and that much of the variation 
in behavior we associate with conscious attention, or lack of it, is to be ex-
plained in terms of variation in the sheer number of co-representing units 
active. (Imagine lots of sticks being pushed from slightly different angles in an 
effort to get a huge stone to move; the more contributing sticks, the higher the 
chance the stone will go where it’s “meant” to go. Similarly with mental repre-
sentations: the sticks correspond to co-referring representations, and the mov-
ing of the huge rock is the body’s skillful or attentive interaction with the en-
vironment.) The embodiment-related data seem to show that what we think of 
as distinctively bodily stimuli (including actually induced movement) increase 
the number of active neural representations in bodily formats or in soma-
tosensory cortex. This results in a stronger contribution to behavioral control 
from those areas, but in the typical case, these units work in conjunction with 
co-referring representations not in a bodily code in order to control behavior. 




At the same time, I sympathize deeply with the sentiment behind Fodor’s re-
marks, partly because none of the contributions listed above go so far as the 
replacement hypothesis. Even when modelers and experimentalists focus on 
the interface between the organism and the environment—and here we might 
begin to think that bodily-action-in-the-world replaces the need for computa-
tional processing—the typical cognitive model remains of the same sort as 
traditional computational and representational ones, at least with regard to its 
abstract characteristics of the sort Fodor has historically cared about. 
Here’s what I have in mind. So far as I can tell, most proponents of strong em-
bodiment theses misunderstand the metaphysical relation of their views to 
classical cognitive research; as a result, they claim that their strongly embod-
ied views stand at odds with functionalism and computationalism (and they 
typically disparage these classical views as “disembodied”). This seems to me 
to be simply wrong. According to the classical view, the physical body (the 
brain, in particular, but this applies to whatever matter realizes the computa-
tional system) determines, in the strict metaphysical sense, which functions 
the human cognitive system computes. That is the very nature of the realiza-
tion-relation. Thus, on the classical view, there’s a one-way determination 
relation running from body to mind; the body is very deeply “in charge” and is 
the root of our cognitive beings. Therefore, unless we construe embodied the-
ories as type-type identity theories—which raises a host of problems—
embodied views are a complement to orthodox views. Embodied approaches 
do make an important contributions; they entail that human computational 
(or otherwise functional) cognitive processes are best described in a fair de-
gree of detail that, practically speaking, can be discovered only by examina-
tion of bodily structures and the ways in which humans interact with their 
environments. But, so long as the embodied theorist isn’t offering type-type 
reduction (the identification of types of cognitive or mental states or processes 
with bodily types of states and processes), the embodied view is no less func-
tionalist, and no less disembodied, than the orthodox view, at least metaphysi-
cally speaking.  
Granted, epistemologically speaking, the embodied approach recommends 
a different methodology than was pursued by many classical computationally 
oriented cognitive scientists. The embodied functionalist lets bodily activity be 
her guide, epistemically, when attempting to figure out which algorithms gov-
ern human cognition and where they’re realized (and how many shortcuts the 
embodied computing system can take given stabilities in the environment). 
But, this has nothing to do with the truth of functionalism but rather it stands 
in opposition to a certain empirical bet that many computationalist-
functionalists made in the early days of cognitive science: that the relevant 
algorithms and the location of the machinery that executes them could be 
identified from the armchair. 




Although there is a lot of research on embodied cognition, some authors 
still explore the relationship between these issues and the classical epis-
temological issues. Do you think that we should have a specific embodied 
epistemology? Or would that be a completely unnecessary effort, as we 
already have conceptions compatible with the notion of embodiment, and 
if so, which concepts may be used in this way? 
I do think a situated perspective has some important implications for tradi-
tional epistemology, partly by bolstering the general case for externalism 
about justification (or warrant). But, to my mind, one of the most interesting 
ways in which the embodied perspective enters into epistemological debates 
is via its bearing on philosophical methodology, that is, on the epistemology of 
philosophy itself. Timothy Williamson has argued that the supposedly exhaus-
tive dichotomy “a priori versus a posteriori justification” is sometimes inapt, 
that its application doesn’t shed light on philosophical matters of great inter-
est; such matters involve possession and application of philosophical concepts 
(such as the concept of justification itself) that cannot be reduced to a sensory 
base and at the same time do not ground analytic truths known a priori by all 
who grasp these concepts. Williamson emphasizes the extent to which bodily 
experiences shape our intuitions about concept application (to hypothetical 
cases, for instance) and argues that two individuals who share the same con-
cept might have had their intuitions shaped by different series of interactions 
with the environment (and the differences in these interactions is not a matter 
of having different stored sensory impressions, in the traditional empiricist’s 
sense). Perhaps without intending to, it seems to me that Williamson presents 
an embodied conception of the formation of philosophical intuition and the 
way it guides responses to thought experiments. People who share the same 
concepts, by many standard epistemological or semantic measures, have dif-
fering embodied experiences connected to that concept. As a result they make 
conflicting judgements about, or have contrasting intuitions in response to, 
philosophical thought experiments. These embodied experiences don’t consti-
tute part of a “reduction base” of experiences out of which concepts are built 
in empiricist fashion, but neither are the judgments they lead subjects to make 
constitutive of the concepts in question and given a priori. I think William-
son’s exactly right (or at least, I think he is on my gloss of his work!). 
Another important epistemological debate concerns the status of the embod-
ied approach itself. On some more extreme versions of the embodied view 
(Lakoff’s, for example), the question of truth doesn’t arise. Folks who eschew 
truth and objective reality (and think instead that we enact our own worlds) 
should do more to explain the epistemological status of their own views or to 
develop a view of cognitive processing that gives an epistemological (and cor-
responding metaphysical) anchor to the embodied view itself. I would find the 
embodied view uninteresting if its strongest advocates could at best say “we 
believe in the embodied view because the fine-grained details of our body 




made us do it”! So, I think there’s pressure on philosophers to develop an em-
bodied epistemology (and accompanying metaphysics) that underwrites their 
own theorizing and theoretical conclusions. 
 
Which contemporary experimental works, in your opinion, are changing 
or will change our view of embodied (or embedded) cognition? 
I think that much of the work on the neural basis of decision-making, plan-
ning, and abstract reasoning is of special importance, with regard to embod-
ied cognition. It’s helping us to gauge the extent, for example, of visceral con-
tributions to these supposedly purely rational processes. We have to go be-
yond the mere observation of activation of motor cortex during so-called 
higher cognitive processing and discover the role (say, via articulatory encod-
ing) that motor processes play in higher cognition. 
Two threads of contemporary cognitive neuroscience seem especially interest-
ing to me. The first involves the exploration of neural re-use and redeploy-
ment, the idea that what have been thought of as various functionally specific 
areas of the brain each participates in a fairly wide variety of forms of cogni-
tive processing. The second involves decoding, the use of machine learning 
resources to extract signatures distinctive of different mental or cognitive 
processes (of, say, physical pain versus emotional pain, or of differing visual 
images). A combination of these kinds of experimental work has the potential 
to offer substantive embodiment-related insights. I’m inclined toward a hy-
brid view—to think that embodied representations and simulation make up 
only part of our cognitive resources, but resources that are constantly in use 
and contributing to the full range of cognitive processes. So, in my ideal 
world, decoding is used to identify the alphabet of neural computing (to iden-
tify the “workings” as Michael Anderson calls them), which I suspect will re-
veal that many of these fundamental components are in fact deeply connected 
to bodily experience and contribute their bodily content to a wide range of 
cognitive processes. 
 
It seems that there are several versions of enactivism, or at least several 
approaches known as enactivism. Some advocates of enactivism empha-
size the convergence, or even the conflation, of cognition and life60. Oth-
ers indicate that there are elements of constructionism in this approach. 
Still others see enactivism as based on law-like relations called sen-
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sorimotor contingencies. Could you describe what valuable insights may 
be prompted by these perspectives in the studies on cognition? 
In my opinion, the most instructive versions of enactivism emphasize the con-
tingency of the range and kinds of properties in the environment that an indi-
vidual human comes to interact with, exploit, and represent. It serves no good 
purpose, in my opinion, for the enactivist to claim that the subject’s acting on 
the environment „brings a world into existence.” In order for the interaction 
to take place, the world must already be there! But, the enactivist is right 
about the following aspect of cognition: which of the many, many properties 
in the world the subject represents or becomes sensitive to depends on the 
subject’s previous interactions and her biologically given capacities and 
needs. There’s a kind of canalization that takes place—over the course of indi-
vidual development, over the course of an entire life (say, in the gradual ac-
quisition of expertise), and over the course of smaller-scale cognitive interac-
tions (in which one kind of output from the agent renders salient to the agent 
a different aspect of the environment than would have been salient to her had 
she taken a slightly different action, with a „snowballing” effect). 
 
“Alternative” approaches in cognitive sciences are undergoing a sort of 
a conceptual turmoil. Some authors propose a notion of “3E Cognition” or 
“4E Cognition” (Embodied, Embedded, Extended, Enacted) as a kind of 
a core, or a sheltering umbrella. Are your arguments—included, among 
others, in Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind—insufficient? 
In chapter 1 of the book, I challenge the utility of that umbrella. The various 
approaches are genuinely distinct; and in some ways, they are in tension with 
each other while in many other ways they are „mix and match.” For example, 
an extended cognitive system might or might not proceed with its cognitive 
tasks in a heavily embedded way. Having disinguished these various views, 
I  proceed, in the first two major sections of the book, to raise various objec-
tions to the extended view in particular and to the arguments in support of it, 
especially when it’s offered as a new paradigm in cognitive science or the ba-
sis of a scientific revolution. But, I also offered a positive theory of cognition 
and cognitive systems (in the book and in more recent papers), one that 
grounds various objections to the extended view (and of arguments in support 
of it) but that also allows, at least in principle, for the appearance of extended 
cognition. I think that’s still where the situation stands.  
I’m a staunch supporter of the embedded view, and combined with my view 
of cognition as the activity of a persisting collection of integrated mechanisms, 
it seems to entail that human cognition takes place inside the organism but 
depends on and exploits external (noncognitive) resources to a surprising 
extent. I’m quite impressed by much of the same empirical work proponents 




of the extended mind are impressed by (Ballard’s work on deictic pointers, for 
instance); in my opinion, though, most of that work supports the organismical-
ly oriented embedded view, as opposed to the extended one. 
I’m also quite committed to a weak embodied view of the human cognitive 
system. Many interpreters of body-related experimental work claim that it 
reveals the bodily constituents of cognition or that it shows that linguistic 
meaning is inherently embodied. I draw a different conclusion. To my mind, 
the experimental results on embodiment show that the cognitive system con-
tains an enormous number of representations that are being activated in par-
allel, and many of them represent the same thing (take the same object, or co-
refer); moreover many of these appear in body-related areas of cortex or rep-
resent bodily processes, and their activation alongside amodal but co-
representing units affects cognitive processing in measurable ways. 
I think the lumping of all of the E-views together has the potential to cause 
a  lot of confusion; after all, some of the most well-known enactivists reject 
representation, yet many proponents of other 4E views embrace representa-
tions. So, it might seem like these various approaches share too little to consti-
tute a coherent view. Then again, some of the basic conceptual ideas behind 
many of these approaches may provide a dovetailing vision of cognition. And 
here I mean to go beyond just the idea that 4Es have a common enemy, a cer-
tain kind of traditional cognitive science (perhaps a straw man, in actuality). 
Rather, I’m claiming that, if wedded together, one might get a picture of hu-
man cognition that looks very different from what one might have extracted 
from such early models of cognition as the General Problem Solver. Here’s the 
possibility I have in mind: There is an organismically centered cognitive sys-
tem that relies heavily on simulations of bodily processes to guide the active 
exploitation of resources in the environment, most often taking up those re-
sources in a fleeting way that does not render those resources truly cognitive, 
but sometimes in durable ways that add new external components (TVSS per-
haps?) to the otherwise bodily bounded cognitive system. 
 
How do you think, are you rather seen as a critic, or rather as an advo-
cate of any approach? 
I would guess that more philosophers know me as a critic of the extended 
view (and the view that groups of humans have minds or cognitive systems) 
than as anything else. But, I think some of my other positive work is reasona-
bly well known, for example, the Best Test Theory of representational content, 
the component-forces theory of ceteris paribus laws, and my developmental 
views about the origins of representations. And, it’s worth noting that some 
distinctively positive views have come out of my critical work on extended 
cognition, including a theory of cognition (that it is constituted only by activity 




in a collection of mechanisms that contribute in overlapping subsets to the 
production of a wide range of forms of intelligent behavior). Grappling with 
embodied views has also led to the formulation of my view that the mind is 
massively representational and wholly subpersonal (in the sense that there is 
no metaphysically distinct personal level or even one of much epistemological 
import). Thinking about the overarching nature of cognition, as a generic 
kind, has also catalyzed a model-based theory of natural kinds, the „tweak-
and-extend” theory, found in some of my most recent work. 
 
How do you perceive the relationship between philosophy and science? 
And what do you think is the value of interdisciplinarity? 
I think the relationship has many facets. Philosophers familiar with scientific 
results and theories can interpret that work for other philosophers and for the 
educated public, by bringing it to bear on issues of long-standing philosophical 
and popular interest. Some such work can be quite revolutionary, changing 
our everyday conception of selves or of social interaction, for example. At the 
same time philosophers can play the role of theorists in the sciences them-
selves, offering precise accounts of foundational concepts (such as that of rep-
resentation) or attempting to help straighten out inconsistencies in the use of 
those concepts. To my mind, though, what’s most interesting, challenging, and 
rewarding results from a kind of freedom philosophers have to survey the 
landscape and attempt to provide an integrated and coherent vision of some 
large domain, identifying a pattern that appears only when one considers 
a wide variety of work being done on different sub-topics in a field or in dif-
ferent scientific fields altogether. 
 
What sorts of gadgets do you usually use in order to “extend” your own 
mind? We mean both science-related extensions as well as the ones that 
you use solely for entertainment. Do you read a lot of printed books? Do 
you still write using pen and paper, and if so, then how often? 
I do most of my writing on my laptop, and I use my iPhone quite a bit. I use 
pen and paper almost every day, mostly for doing quick calculations, making 
lists, or writing personal reflections and notes. I read only paper books, alt-
hough I do often read journal articles on the computer screen. I’m even more 
of a Luddite when it comes to entertainment. In that domain, I don’t use any 
“mind-extending” technologies (although it depends on how liberal an ap-
proach we take—is a guitar mind-extending technology?). 
 
 




What educational and academic choices guided you to the subjects you 
are currently interested in? Did you experience any dramatic change 
in research interests during your career? What did you imagine your fu-
ture would turn out to be like when you were a teenager? 
I was very much interested in psychology and the human condition when 
I was young, but largely through literature, history, movies, and songs—in 
other words, from a more humanistic perspective. But as I began taking col-
lege courses, analytic philosophy seemed to promise the most enduring or 
abstract truths, and it also drew on my longstanding fascination with analyti-
cal puzzles and games. I think those inclinations ultimately led me to 
a  scientific approach to the exploration of content, consciousness, and cogni-
tion. The sort of philosophy that offered the deepest and less purely specula-
tive insight into the mind was oriented toward the sciences. I might add that 
in my first philosophy of mind course, the professor (Charles Marks)  assigned 
Nisbett and Wilson’s 1977 paper, “Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal 
Reports on Mental Processes,” which instilled in me a healthy skepticism re-
garding our “pure” philosophical intuitions about the workings of the mind. 
My current research interests grew initially out of my fascination with logic 
and philosophy of language. These latter interests turned me toward the mind 
at the very end of my undergraduate education when I encountered external-
ist semantics for mental states. Then, in the summer after I finished my bache-
lor’s degree, I attended a seminar on mental content co-taught by Scott 
Soames—who was at that time a serial visitor in my department—and Charles 
Marks, my department’s resident philosopher of mind. I had been thinking 
extensively about the indeterminacy of reference and the causal theory of 
reference, and the way some of these issues connected up skeptical views in 
epistemology and philosophy of science. Then, in the seminar with Soames 
and Marks, I saw how to cast many of these issues as questions about mental 
content and the mind’s causal connection with the word. It was in this course, 
too, that I had my first substantive exposure to Fodor’s work and began to 
think of philosophy of mind as deeply empirically informed. 
When I was a teen-ager, I wanted to be a musician, a folk rocker like Bob Dyl-
an or Neil Young—and I wanted play lead guitar like Jerry Garcia. But I  was 
realistic with regard to my career options. I had intellectual leanings and abil-
ities and assumed they would lead to stimulating remunerated work, proba-
bly to do with politics or history, that would in some way put me into contact 
with great texts of history and the community of human thinkers. But, to be 
honest, none of these thoughts took the form of concrete commitments or 
plans when I was a teenager. I was carefree and idealistic. I wanted to play 
music and read books and think deeps thoughts, and my attitude was, well, 
whatever happens happens. (I must admit that I encouraged my own children 
to give their adult futures more careful consideration!) 
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